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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida intermediate appellate courts decided a series of cases in 
the child welfare field ranging from issues related to representation of par-
ents in dependency proceedings and proper procedure at shelter hearings, to 
a range of issues in termination of parental rights (TPR) cases this past sur-
vey year.  The intermediate courts ruled on a lesser number of delinquency 
area cases.  As is true with each survey, decisions in the delinquency area 
that are linked to issues of criminal procedure, and which are not unique to 
the juvenile delinquency field, are not covered.1  Finally, this article summa-
rizes the symposium held at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad 
Law Center regarding the American Bar Association Model Act Governing 
Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceed-
ings.2
II. DEPENDENCY
Dependency proceedings often start when the child is removed from the 
home and taken into custody based upon a probable cause determination that 
the child is “abused, neglected, or abandoned or . . . is in imminent danger of 
[an] illness or injury as a result of abuse, neglect, or abandonment,” there is a 
violation of an order of the court, or there are no parents or other guardians 
available.3  When the law enforcement officer takes the child into custody, 
the officer may release the child to a parent or legal custodian or other re-
 * Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.  This 
survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012. 
 1. See Michael J. Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law, 35 NOVA L. REV. 137, 137 (2010) 
[hereinafter Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
 2. See generally Symposium, 36 NOVA L. REV. 309 (2012). 
 3. FLA. STAT. § 39.401(1)(b) (2012). 
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sponsible adult, or may place the child in the care of an authorized agent of 
the Department of Children and Families (DCF).4  The child may also be 
placed in shelter care under certain circumstances.5  When placement in a 
shelter occurs, the parent must be notified, and a shelter care hearing shall 
take place, generally speaking, within twenty-four hours after the placement.6
At that shelter hearing, the court will determine if there is probable cause to 
keep the child in shelter status pending further investigation of the case.7
Because parents are statutorily entitled to counsel at all stages of dependency 
proceedings in Florida, they must be advised of their right to counsel at the 
shelter hearing.8  Unfortunately, the intermediate appellate courts periodi-
cally must reverse on the grounds that the trial court failed to advise the par-
ents of their right to counsel.  In A.G. v. Florida Department of Children & 
Families,9 that is exactly what happened.10  At the shelter hearing, the court 
did not ask the father if he had representation, and the court did not “clarify 
whether the father wished to waive his right to counsel.”11  Only at the con-
clusion of the hearing did the court appoint counsel for future hearings.12  On 
that basis the appellate court granted the father’s writ of certiorari.13  In G.W. 
v. Department of Children & Families,14 the Third District Court of Appeal 
was faced with the same issue.15  The appellate court granted a father certio-
rari from an order at a shelter hearing in Miami in which the father claimed 
he was denied his rights to counsel.16  In granting the writ of certiorari, the 
appellate court was blunt in its reversal.17  The following description is in-
structive: 
 In the midst of the staccato-paced hearing conducted by the 
trial court in this case, the court stated, inter alia, “and I’m appoint-
ing counsel for the father.”  Under the circumstance, the father 
missed the point.  As the hearing continued, both the father and his 
family members begged to speak to the court.  The father stated on 
 4. Id. §§ 39.01(21), .401(2). 
 5. Id. § 39.402(4). 
 6. Id. § 39.402(5), (8)(a)–(b). 
 7. Id. § 39.402(8)(d)1. 
 8. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.320(a)(1), 8.515(a)(1). 
 9. 65 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 10. See id. at 1183. 
 11. Id. at 1181. 
 12. Id. at 1182. 
 13. Id. at 1181. 
 14. 92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 15. See id. at 308. 
 16. Id.
 17. See id. at 310. 
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two occasions:  “Can I say something?,” “Can I say something, 
please?”  Then, as the trial court indicated she was prepared to 
close down the hearing, he asked, “Why can’t I say anything?,” to 
which the court finally acceded briefly.  On the last page of the 
shelter hearing transcript, the . . . court stated, “And you call your 
lawyer, [G.W.], okay?,” to which G.W. responded, “Hold on, I 
didn’t know I had one.”  An unidentified speaker said, “They’re 
going to give [one] to you.”  After scheduling dates for further 
proceedings, the hearing then concluded.18
After referencing the due process right to counsel at a shelter hearing de-
scribing the statute as “replete with language requiring counsel at this critical 
stage of the dependency process,” the appellate court in A.G. closed with the 
following statement:  The trial court’s failure to provide the father the oppor-
tunity to have counsel present at the shelter hearing “constituted a clear de-
parture from the essential requirements of the law amounting to a miscar-
riage of justice.”19
In K.G. v. Florida Department of Children and Families,20 decided on 
the same day as A.G.,21 the First District Court of Appeal granted a petition 
for certiorari sought by the mother because, at a shelter hearing, the court 
would not allow the mother’s attorney to speak and directed that the child be 
placed with the maternal grandmother without allowing the mother to present 
any evidence or otherwise be heard.22  Florida law explicitly requires the trial 
court to provide an appearing party an opportunity to be heard and present 
evidence at all of the hearings.23  The appellate court held that the failure to 
allow the mother to present evidence violated her due process right to be 
heard and was “a clear departure from the essential requirements of the law 
amounting to a miscarriage of justice.”24
S.M. v. R.M.25 is yet another case in which the court failed to allow evi-
dence at a shelter hearing.26  In S.M., the appellate court treated the appeal as 
 18. Id. at 309 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 19. A.G. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 65 So. 3d 1180, 1182–83 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
 20. 66 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 21. A.G., 65 So. 3d at 1180; K.G., 66 So. 3d at 366. 
 22. K.G., 66 So. 3d at 367. 
 23. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(8)(c)(3) (2012); see also FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.305(b)(4); Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs. v. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. (In re Interest of J.T.), 947 So. 2d 1212, 
1215 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); L.M.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 935 So. 2d 47, 47 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); F.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 758 So. 2d 1262, 1264 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 24. K.G., 66 So. 3d at 368–69. 
 25. 82 So. 3d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
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a writ of certiorari and reversed.27  Contained in the opinion is the following 
statement from the transcript: 
Mother’s Attorney:  I object to the entire lack of due process in 
this case, to the procedure that has been followed, the questioning, 
and my failure to be allowed to put on any witnesses, the sudden 
urgency of the hearing . . . . The guardian ad litem’s report being 
admitted without any cross-examination and my [not being al-
lowed] to put on one witness.28
In granting the writ, the appellate court described the cases as being “indis-
tinguishable” from K.G.29
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes provides that a petition may be filed 
for dependency “by an attorney for the [DCF] or any other person who [is] 
knowledge[able] of the facts . . . or is informed of them and believes that 
they are true.”30  In Florida Department of Children & Families v. Y.C.,31 a 
mother filed a dependency proceeding naming herself as the respondent.32
Described as a private dependency petition,33 the mother “alleged that . . . her 
children were at risk of harm based on [the father’s] various acts of vio-
lence.”34  DCF had previously determined that intervention was not war-
ranted.35  The mother was upset with this finding and commenced the pro-
ceeding herself.36  The Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) Program “moved to have 
the trial court order the [DCF] to file a case plan and provide services.”37
Then “DCF filed a limited appearance to object to [the] motion.”38  The trial 
court, without holding a trial or admitting any evidence, “entered an order of 
dependency.”39  As the appellate court explained, “[t]he sole basis then or 
ever asserted for the order was the fact that Y.C. had defaulted and thus ‘ad-
 26. Id. at 164. 
 27. Id.
 28. Id. at 166 (alterations in original). 
 29. Id. at 170. 
 30. FLA. STAT. § 39.501(1) (2012). 
 31. 82 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 32. Id. at 1140. 
 33. Id.; Michael J. Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, 36 NOVA L. REV. 179, 183 (2011) 
[hereinafter Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
 34. Y.C., 82 So. 3d at 1140. 
 35. Id.
 36. Id.
 37. Id. at 1140–41. 
 38. Id. at 1141. 
 39. Y.C., 82 So. 3d at 1141. 
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mitted’ her own allegations of dependency.”40  DCF sought a writ which the 
appellate court granted.41  In so doing, the appellate court explained that there 
was no “case or controversy and . . . therefore, [no] basis for court action.”42
The court explained that one cannot file a lawsuit, admit the allegations, and 
thus control authority of the court to act.43  Finally, the appellate court added 
the following:  “We are bound to say that neither the trial court nor the GAL 
should have allowed itself to become involved in the combination charade-
theatre of the absurd, which played itself out below.”44
Chapter 39 contains a number of grounds for findings of dependency.45
One of them is that while there is no present abuse, neglect, or abandonment, 
one of the three can be made out upon the basis that the parent’s behavior 
constitutes a present threat to the child which, although “prospective” in na-
ture, is imminent.46  The issue in S.S. v. Department of Children & Families47
was whether allegations of chronic use of a controlled substance or alcohol, 
acts of violence, neglect of the children’s dental health, and psychological 
instability were proven to be prospective and imminent.48  The appellate 
court reversed, finding that while the mother drank a lot it was not sufficient 
to constitute “extensive, abus[e], and chronic use” and that a single item of 
evidence of alleged illegal substance abuse was the result of inadmissible 
hearsay evidence.49  The child protective investigator “neither administered 
[a urine screen, nor] performed the chemical analysis, [n]or interpreted the 
results,” and so could not testify “to lay the necessary predicate to introduce 
the lab report containing the drug test results.”50  There was no evidence that 
the children witnessed or that they were affected by incidents of domestic 
 40. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 41. See id. at 1141 & n.6. 
 42. Id. at 1141 & n.7. 
 43. Id. at 1141–42. 
 44. Y.C., 82 So. 3d at 1145 n.17. 
 45. See FLA. STAT. § 39.401 (2012). 
 46. S.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 81 So. 3d 618, 621 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2012) (quoting J.B.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 870 So. 2d 946, 951 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004)); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.401(1)(b)(1); Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra
note 33, at 182. 
 47. 81 So. 3d 618 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 48. Id. at 621–23. 
 49. Id. at 621–22 (citing J.B.M., 870 So. 2d at 949). 
 50. Id. (citing J.B.M., 870 So. 2d at 949). 
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violence.51  Finally, there was no nexus between the mother’s psychiatric 
disorder and the children’s health.52
A question upon which the intermediate appellate courts are split is 
whether a finding that a child who was “at substantial risk of imminent 
abuse, abandonment, or neglect”53 may be made where there was a prior ad-
judication of dependency against the other parent.54  The issue before the 
Third District Court of Appeal in D.A. v. Department of Children and Family 
Services,55 was whether it should follow the opinion of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in P.S. v. Department of Children and Families,56 which 
held that, as a matter of statutory construction, after a finding of neglect as to 
one parent, the only finding of dependency in the supplemental order against 
the second parent is that there be “actual” abuse, abandonment, or neglect.57
The Third District Court of Appeal rejected this approach in a split opinion, 
finding that the word “actual” is not in the statute, that the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal hindered the purpose behind the statutory prohibition 
against more than one dependency adjudication, and that two different stan-
dards have no apparent rationale.58
An interesting sidelight in D.A. is the fact that the DCF confessed error 
based upon the P.S. case, whereas the GAL Program took the position “that 
the trial court’s supplemental adjudication [in the] dependency [was] cor-
rect.”59  Of interest here is the fact the GAL Program undertook the role of 
petitioner to prove the allegation of prospective neglect.60  This action, taking 
on the role usually played by DCF—seeking to prove the allegation of ne-
glect—is permissible under Florida law although the usual role of the GAL 
in a dependency case around the country is solely to represent the best inter-
est of the child oftentimes as a non-party expert.61
 51. Id. at 623. 
 52. S.S., 81 So. 3d at 623 (quoting B.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 797 So. 2d 
1261, 1264 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001)) (citing I.T. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilita-
tive Servs., 532 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)). 
 53. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(f) (2012). 
 54. Compare D.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 84 So. 3d 1136, 1138–39 (Fla. 
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012), with P.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 4 So. 3d 719, 720–21 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 55. 84 So. 3d 1136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 56. 4 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 57. D.A., 84 So. 3d at 1139 (citing P.S., 4 So. 3d at 720–21); P.S., 4 So. 3d at 720–21. 
 58. D.A., 84 So. 3d at 1140, 1141; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(f). 
 59. D.A., 84 So. 3d at 1138. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Michael J. Dale, Reporting the Child Crisis § 406 [1] pp 4 - 67 – 70 (LexisNexis 
2012), FLA. STAT. §§ 39.501(2), .807(2)(a)–(b); see also FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.215.  In addition, 
6
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Another case involving the issue of prospective neglect is S.T. v. De-
partment of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of K.C. & D.C.).62  In 
that case, DCF alleged that there was “prospective abuse [and] neglect by the 
father and prospective neglect by the mother.”63  The allegations were that 
the father’s use of alcohol was “chronic, extensive, and abusive [and] . . . 
would likely continue” and thus cause the children to be at “substantial risk 
of imminent abuse and neglect from the father . . . [and] that the mother was 
aware of the father’s use . . . but denied that he had a problem and allowed 
the father to transport the children home from school, despite his alcohol 
problem.”64  In a heavily documented analysis of the allegations, the appel-
late court demonstrated why it is necessary that the petitioner should present 
any admissible evidence that may form the basis of the court’s finding.65
DCF presented “[n]o representative of the [agency] who had contact with the 
family, . . . nor . . . either child, nor . . . any expert witness such as a psy-
chologist or counselor.”66  The individuals who testified were the parents, the 
elementary school principal, the assistant kindergarten teacher, and the sur-
rogate grandmother.67  The trial court discounted the parents’ testimony 
based upon credibility.68  However, the Second District Court of Appeal stat-
ed, “it is difficult to discern the evidence the circuit court relied upon to sup-
port its determination of dependency as to the mother.”69  As to the father, 
the independent witnesses did not provide evidence of the father’s alcohol 
use or that his use demonstrably affected the children as required by Florida 
law.70  Further, there was no “competent evidence that the mother knew that 
the father was endangering the children by his conduct.”71  Thus the Second 
District Court of Appeal reversed.72
In a dependency proceeding, after an adjudication and disposition in-
volving the development of the case plan, when the parent complies with the 
case plan, the parent may file a motion for a reunification.73  In C.M. v. De-
both DCF and the GAL Program are agencies of the executive branch.  See FLA. STAT. §§ 
20.19(2)(a), 39.8296(2)(a).
 62. 87 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 63. Id.
 64. Id. at 828–29. 
 65. See id. at 833. 
 66. Id. at 829. 
 67. In re Interest of K.C. & D.C., 87 So. 3d at 834. 
 68. Id.
 69. Id.
 70. Id. at 834–35. 
 71. Id. at 835. 
 72. In re Interest of K.C. & D.C., 87 So. 3d at 836. 
 73. FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10) (2012). 
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partment of Children & Family Services (In re Interest of G.M.),74 the mother 
appealed from two final orders of the trial court.75  The court “denied her 
motion for reunification and terminated protective supervision with her child 
[who was] in the custody of [a] nonoffending father.”76  The child had been 
adjudicated dependent two years later and was reunified with his father in 
Georgia, where the child resided since that time.77  Under Florida law, there 
are a set of standards that the court must apply on a motion by a parent for 
reunification or increased contact with a child.78  In the case at bar, the trial 
court failed to include any of the findings required under either statute, and 
the Second District Court of Appeal was forced to reverse.79
A second reunification case involved the obligation of the court not to 
select a better permanency option, but rather to determine that the parent has 
complied with the case plan and to allow reunification, unless the reunifica-
tion would endanger the child.80  This was the issue in S.V.-R. v. Department 
of Children & Family Services.81  A mother of two children appealed from an 
order denying her motion for reunification with the child following substan-
tial compliance with the tasks in the case plan.82  The Third District Court of 
Appeal held, in reversing the trial court, that neither DCF nor the GAL 
proved endangerment of the safety, well-being, or health of the child.83  It 
also held that the permanency determination granting custody to the father 
instead of the mother incorrectly applied the best interest factor.84  The diffi-
cult issue described by the Third District Court of Appeal was how the law 
applies when a non-offending parent seeks to become the permanent custo-
dial parent when a dependency proceeding ends with the offending parent 
seeking reunification.85  The appellate court noted that the trial court charge 
was not to select the better dependency option, and that neither DCF nor the 
GAL program demonstrated that the health and well-being of the children 
 74. 73 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 75. Id. at 321. 
 76. Id.
 77. Id.
 78. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.522(2), .621(10). 
 79. In re Interest of G.M., 73 So. 3d at 323. 
 80. S.V.-R v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 77 So. 3d 687, 689–90 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 81. 77 So. 3d 687, 688 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 82. Id.
 83. Id. at 689. 
 84. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10) (2012)). 
 85. Id. at 690. 
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/4
2013] 2012 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW 341
will be endangered by the reunification.86  Thus the appellate court re-
versed.87
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide for discovery which in 
most respects follows the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.88  The issue in 
Colaizzo v. Office of Criminal Conflict & Civil Regional Counsel,89 was 
whether the Office of Regional Counsel or DCF should pay the fee to an 
expert witness in a deposition taken in a TPR case.90  “The doctor sent a bill 
for the deposition to” the Office of Regional Counsel.91  He had not been 
paid by an organization known as the “Child Protection Team, an independ-
ent, non-profit organization [that] investigat[ed] allegations of child abuse,” 
which was funded by the State, and operated under the Florida Department 
of Health for whom he worked.92  The Fourth District Court of Appeal held 
that under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the party seeking to take an 
expert deposition is responsible for the fee.93  Thus, the appellate court re-
versed and remanded to the trial court to hold a hearing under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure that provides “‘[u]nless manifest injustice would result, the 
court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reason-
able fee for time spent in responding to discovery.’”94
The issue of the court’s ability in a dependency proceeding to order par-
ties to submit to a psychological evaluation was before the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in J.B. v. M.M.95  In a private dependency proceeding 
brought by the child’s paternal grandparent, the appellant brought a writ of 
certiorari to the Fourth District Court of Appeal in order to challenge the trial 
court’s order that she submit to a psychological evaluation.96  Under Florida 
law, in order to require such an examination, there must be a finding that the 
mental health of the parent is in controversy and good cause must be 
shown.97  While the mother suffered from a schizoaffective disorder, there 
was no finding of good cause because the only evidence of “the mother’s 
alleged inability to parent her daughter [was] over eight years old.”98  Thus, 
 86. S.V.-R., 77 So. 3d at 690. 
 87. Id. at 690–91. 
 88. Compare FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.245, with FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280. 
 89. 82 So. 3d 195 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 90. Id. at 195. 
 91. Id. at 196. 
 92. Id.
 93. Id. at 197–98; see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280(b)(5)(A), (C), 1.390(c). 
 94. Colaizzo, 82 So. 3d at 197–98 (quoting FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280(b)(5)(C)). 
 95. 92 So. 3d 888, 889 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 
 96. Id.
 97. FLA. STAT. § 39.407(15) (2012). 
 98. J.B., 92 So. 3d at 890. 
9
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the Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the writ.99  Oddly, the GAL at-
torney assigned to the case took no position on the issue.100
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Among the grounds for TPR in Chapter 39 is when a parent is involved 
in conduct that “threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or 
emotional health of the child.”101  In addition, it must be shown that termina-
tion is in the manifest best interests of the child.102  Applying this law to the 
facts in Caso v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,103 the Third 
District Court of Appeal found that the parent’s mental health problems 
made the parent unable to understand or appreciate the needs of the child.104
Experiencing delusions which made the parent unable to appreciate the real-
ity of the situation apparent to a child are grounds for a finding of TPR.105
Issues involving proper application of the Supreme Court of Florida’s 
1991 seminal opinion in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative 
Services106 come up regularly in the intermediate appellate courts.107  In 
Padgett, the court had determined that if the termination was based solely on 
abuse of the sibling, the welfare department must also prove before the court 
that there was a substantial risk of significant harm to the child from the 
abuse of the sibling.108  The issue in Department of Children & Family Ser-
vices v. K.D. & Z.H. (In re Interest of Z.C.(1) & Z.C.(2)),109 was whether 
applying the so-called “nexus test” for a prospective conflicted relationship 
between the past abuse of the child and prospective abuse of another child 
involves a totality of circumstance analysis.110  The court then applied the 
 99. Id.
 100. Id.
 101. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c). 
 102. In re Interest of Baby Boy A., 544 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); 
see Caso v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 569 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990); In re Interest of J.A., 561 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per cu-
riam); In re Interest of M.J., 543 So. 2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 103. 569 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 104. See id. at 470. 
 105. D.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 87 So. 3d 1279, 1281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 106. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991). 
 107. See Dale, 2011 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 33, at 182. 
 108. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571. 
 109. 88 So. 3d 977 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (en banc). 
 110. Id. at 982–86. 
10
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totality of circumstances test developed in the series of cases following 
Padgett111 and found that the nexus existed.112
Florida law provides that in dependency cases, a case plan is generally 
required.113  One of the grounds for TPR in Florida is the situation where the 
child is adjudicated dependent, the parent has been offered a case plan, and 
that the welfare department alleges that the “child continues to be abused, 
neglected, or abandoned.”114  This ground is evaluated in terms of whether 
the parent has substantially complied with the case plan.115  The question of 
whether the parent substantially complied with the case plan was before the 
Second District Court of Appeal in N.F. v. Department of Children & Family 
Services (In re Interest of N.F.).116  Whether there has been substantial com-
pliance is an evidentiary question.117  In reversing and remanding the finding 
of TPR, the appellate court in In re Interest of N.F. said:  “In short, [DCF’s] 
position amounted to nothing more than parroted statutory phrases and bald 
incantations of buzzwords.  Such conclusory assertions, devoid of factual 
support, were not competent [to stand as] substantial evidence—let alone 
clear and convincing evidence—of anything.”118
A second case dealing with TPR based upon an assertion that the parent 
failed to substantially comply with the case plan is E.R.-J. v. Department of 
Children & Family Services (In re Interest of N.R.-G.).119  In that case, the 
Second District Court of Appeal also reversed.120  The sole ground for termi-
nation was that “the [f]ather . . . [failed] to substantially comply with [the] 
case plan.”121  The appellate court noted that “failure to comply with [the] 
 111. Id. at 983–86 (citing Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 608, 
611 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); R.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re Interest of M.F. 
& M.F.), 770 So. 2d 1189, 1194 & n.13 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); T.L. v. Dep’t of Children & 
Family Servs. (In re Interest of D.L.H.), 990 So. 2d 1267, 1272–73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2008); K.A. v. Dept. of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of K.A. & K.A.), 880 So. 2d 
705, 709–10 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct App. 2004); A.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re
Interest of G.D. & C.D.), 870 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); C.M. v. Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of C.M., C.M., & Z.M.), 844 So. 2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003)); see also Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571. 
 112. In re Interest of Z.C.(1) & Z.C.(2), 88 So. 3d at 986. 
 113. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e) (2012). 
 114. Id. § 39.806(1)(e)1. 
 115. Id.
 116. 82 So. 3d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 117. See id.
 118. Id. at 1195–96 (citing C.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 974 So. 2d 495, 502 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Norris v. Norris, 926 So. 2d 485, 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2006)). 
 119. 86 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 120. Id. at 582. 
 121. Id. at 579; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e) (2012). 
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case plan is not sufficient, in and of itself, to support [TPR].”122  The appel-
late court held that there was no evidence that the child’s welfare and safety 
was in danger by any of the father’s alleged abuses of the case plan such as 
lack of financial resources, completing the parenting plan, or moving to Ok-
lahoma.123  Finally, the court noted that the failure to comply with the case 
plan was “attribut[ed] to the [f]ather’s lack of financial resources” as well as 
DCF’s “failure to provide services.”124  Thus the appellate court reversed.125
Just because the parent fails to complete a case plan does not mean that 
his or her parental rights should be terminated.126  In A.H. v. Florida Depart-
ment of Children & Family Services,127 the First District Court of Appeal 
agreed with the DCF’s concession that the evidence did not establish that the 
parent’s continuing involvement in his children’s lives threatened their safety 
or well-being because the DCF did not prove that the appellant failed to sub-
stantially comply with the case plan within the meaning of the Florida Stat-
utes.128  The Florida Statutes also require evidence that “the well-being and 
safety of the children would in any way be endangered if they were [with 
the] appellant.”129
The parents appealed from an order terminating their parental rights 
based upon their failure to comply with the case plan in D.M. v. Department 
of Children & Families.130  The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed as to 
the father but reversed as to the mother, finding that there was no “clear and 
convincing proof that [the mother’s] parental rights should be terminated.”131
Specifically, the evidence showed that the mother made consistent efforts to 
improve and was on track for additional progress.132  The first therapist’s 
testimony applied favorably to the mother, as did the testimony of the 
GAL.133  In fact, the undisputed testimony was that the mother would not 
 122. In re Interest of N.R.-G., 86 So. 3d at 580 (citing In re Interest of N.F., 82 So. 3d at 
1192; I.Z. v. B.H., 53 So. 3d 406, 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); R.F. v. Dep’t of Children 




 125. Id. at 582. 
 126. A.H. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 85 So. 3d 1213, 1217 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2012); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)2. 
 127. 85 So. 3d 1213 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 128. Id. at 1218–19; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c). 
 129. A.H., 85 So. 3d at 1218; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c). 
 130. 79 So. 3d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 131. Id. at 137, 139. 
 132. Id. at 139. 
 133. Id.
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/4
2013] 2012 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW 345
usually decline therapy.134  In an interesting piece of dictum, the court re-
jected a challenge by one of the lawyers to the participation of the GAL.135
That the GAL’s recommendation regarding termination was contrary to the 
child’s express wishes was not reversible error because, while a party, the 
child’s wishes are not the sole governing factor in a TPR proceeding.136
Thirty-three years ago, the Supreme Court of Florida held that parents 
were entitled to counsel in a TPR proceeding.137  In T.M.W. v. T.A.C.,138 the 
trial court failed to provide counsel to a father in a TPR proceeding.139  In 
this case, the mother, rather than the DCF, filed a petition to terminate the 
father’s parental rights.140  The petition alleged that, inter alia, the father’s 
rights should be terminated because he had been sentenced to life in prison 
for attempted first degree murder.141  “The trial court heard both [the father’s 
pro se] motion to dismiss and the petition to terminate parental rights at a 
single telephonic hearing” as the father was in prison.142  Although there was 
no transcript of the hearing provided to the appellate court, the father, pro se
before the appellate court, argued that “the trial court did not advise him that 
he had a right to counsel, and denied [him counsel] when he asked for repre-
sentation even though he [told] the trial court that he was indigent.”143  The 
appellate court held that there was no evidence that the court appointed 
counsel for the father, nor was there evidence that the judge made “written 
findings indicating that [the father] waived that right.”144  The appellate court 
noted that, even in the context of a private TPR proceeding, under the state 
statute there is the right to counsel as the law makes no distinction in the type 
of proceeding.145  Incredibly, “the trial court [also] held that [the father] did 
not have standing to contest the TPR because he was not listed on the puta-
tive father registry, was not on the child’s birth certificate, [and] had never 
been named as the father by any court,” nor had he ever paid child support.146
 134. Id. at 139–40. 
 135. D.M., 79 So. 3d at 140. 
 136. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.810 (2012)); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.807(2)(b).  It ap-
pears that one of the children was not represented by counsel.  See D.M., 79 So. 3d at 137. 
 137. In re Interest of D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980). 
 138. 80 So. 3d 1103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 139. Id. at 1105. 
 140. Id. at 1104. 
 141. Id.
 142. Id. at 1104–05. 
 143. T.M.W., 80 So. 3d at 1105. 
 144. Id. at 1106. 
 145. Id. at 1105–06; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.807(1)(a) (2012). 
 146. T.M.W., 80 So. 3d at 1105. 
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The appellate court found that there was “a final judgment of paternity in the 
record . . . establish[ing] that [the individual was] the father of the child.”147
IV. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A juvenile appealed from a conviction of trespass on school grounds.148
In B.C. v. State,149 the issue on appeal was whether there was any evidence 
that the school principal or his designee ordered the respondent to leave the 
school grounds.150  That requirement is part of the statute, and thus, the First 
District Court of Appeal reversed.151  The person who ordered the individual 
to leave was a deputy police officer who described himself as a “‘school 
board police officer’ assigned to [the] school.”152  The evidence demonstrated 
that the police officer “was not under the ‘command’ of the . . . principal and 
had no ‘connection’ with the principal’s office.”153  In reversing the decision, 
the court recognized conflict with the Third District Court of Appeal’s deci-
sion in D.J. v. State.154  To the extent that the opinion did not comport with 
the Third District opinion, the First District certified conflict.155
As previous surveys have indicated, among the various dispositional al-
ternatives available in Florida is an order of restitution.156  In D.W. v. State,157
the juvenile appealed the restitution order requiring her to pay $400 to her 
grandmother.158  The Second District Court of Appeal reversed based upon 
procedural irregularities.159  The juvenile court ordered the restitution matter 
to be heard by a magistrate.160  The appellate court reversed because first, it 
could “[find] no . . . authority that allowed the juvenile court to delegate its 
judicial determination of the amount of restitution to a magistrate,” and sec-
ond, the magistrate relied upon a rule of juvenile procedure related to de-
 147. Id.
 148. B.C. v. State, 70 So. 3d 666, 668 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011); see also FLA. STAT. § 
810.097(2). 
 149. 70 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 150. Id. at 669. 
 151. Id. at 671. 
 152. Id. at 668. 
 153. Id.
 154. B.C., 70 So. 3d at 669; see also D.J. v. State, 43 So. 3d 176, 177 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App.), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010), and rev’d, 67 So. 3d 1029 (Fla. 2011). 
 155. B.C., 70 So. 3d at 669, 671. 
 156. See Dale, 2010 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 1, at 150; Michael J. Dale, 2009 
Survey of Juvenile Law, 34 NOVA L. REV. 199, 216 (2009). 
 157. 77 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
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pendency cases which would allow the child to file exception for the magis-
trate’s ruling.161  Based upon this strange behavior—the appellate court also 
noted “that the magistrate usually [handles] dependency hearings and has 
little experience with . . . restitution,”—the appellate court reversed.162
In a case involving a rather minor contretemps between a police officer 
and a juvenile, the juvenile appealed from adjudication on two grounds—
providing a false name and resisting an officer without violence.163  Under 
the facts of the case, the police officer saw a group of individuals standing 
near a “‘no loitering or soliciting’” sign.164  “There [is] no evidence that the 
officer in any way restrained [the] appellant’s . . . movement . . . or in any 
way indicated to [the] appellant and his friends that they were not free to 
leave.”165  Thus, when the appellant provided a false name to the officer, the 
two “were engaged in a consensual encounter.”166  If there was no lawful 
detention or arrest, the juvenile could not be guilty of the crime of providing 
a false name.167  Furthermore, evidence of the existence of the no trespassing 
sign was insufficient to establish that the property was posted in a way within 
the meaning of Florida law so that the officer would have probable cause to 
arrest the appellant for trespassing.168
At the dispositional stage of a delinquency case, the court is given the 
authority to deviate from the recommendations of the Department of Juvenile 
Justice (DJJ) when the DJJ issues a predisposition report (PDR).169  In M.H. 
v. State,170 the juvenile “pled guilty to possession with intent to sell, manu-
facture, or deliver a controlled substance.”171  The trial court deviated from 
the recommendations of probation and placed the juvenile in a moderate-risk 
facility.172  The test for deviation is contained in E.A.R. v. State.173  There, the 
Supreme Court of Florida set out a two-part test which makes deviation a 
 161. Id. at 805 (citing Mansell v. State, 498 So. 2d 604, 604 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 162. D.W., 77 So. 3d at 805. 
 163. D.T. v. State, 87 So. 3d 1235, 1237–38 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 164. Id. at 1237. 
 165. Id. at 1238. 
 166. Id. (citing State v. Page, 73 So. 3d 351, 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); O.A. v. 
State, 754 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)). 
 167. Id. (citing K.D. v. State, 43 So. 3d 829, 829 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per cu-
riam)). 
 168. D.T., 87 So. 3d at 1240 (citing Baker v. State, 813 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002)). 
 169. See FLA. STAT. § 985.433(7)(b) (2012); see also M.H. v. State, 69 So. 3d 325, 326 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 170. 69 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 171. Id. at 326. 
 172. Id.
 173. 4 So. 3d 614, 638 (Fla. 2009). 
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difficult matter.174  The trial court must do more than place generalized rea-
sons on the record.175  Rather, it must engage in a well-reasoned and com-
plete analysis of the PDR of the court and the type of facility to which the 
court intends to send the child.176
A second case involving a deviation from a recommendation of the DJJ 
in a delinquency case is B.L.R. v. State.177  There the First District Court of 
Appeal reversed a court order committing a child to a maximum-risk facility 
rather than a high-risk facility as suggested by the DJJ.178  Applying E.A.R.,
the appellate court held that the trial court may not deviate just because it 
disagrees with the disposition recommended by the DJJ, and it may neither 
“‘parrot’ [n]or ‘regurgitate’ the information in the PDR to support [the] de-
parture” decision.179
V. CONCLUSION
In the survey year, the Florida appellate courts focused heavily on de-
pendency and TPR cases.180  The Supreme Court of Florida was inactive re-
garding these issues.181  And finally, in February of 2012, the Nova Law Re-
view sponsored a symposium on the implementation of the American Bar 
Association Model Act governing representation of children in abuse, ne-
glect, and dependency proceedings, co-sponsored by the American Bar As-
sociation.182 Nova Law Review published eight articles from authors around 
the country.183  Included are articles directed to the ABA Model Act184 and 
 174. See id.
 175. See id.
 176. See id.; see also C.M.H. v. State, 25 So. 3d 678, 679 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(per curiam) (quoting E.A.R., 4 So. 3d at 638). 
 177. 74 So. 3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). 
 178. Id.
 179. Id. at 176 (quoting E.A.R., 4 So. 3d at 633, 638); see also M.J.S. v. State, 6 So. 3d 
1268, 1270 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting E.A.R., 4 So. 3d at 638); N.B. 
v. State, 911 So. 2d 833, 835 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing K.M. v. State, 891 So. 2d 
619, 620 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 180. See S.T. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Interest of K.C. & D.C.), 87 So. 
3d 827, 828 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); D.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 84 So. 
3d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); S.S. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 81 So. 3d 
618, 620 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012); T.M.W. v. T.A.C., 80 So. 3d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2012); D.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 79 So. 3d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
 181. See Florida Supreme Court 2012 Opinions, FLA. SUPREME CT., 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2012/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 182. Athornia Steele, Introduction to the Symposium, 36 NOVA L. REV. 309, 309 n.* 
(2012). 
 183. See generally Symposium, supra note 2. 
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the role of counsel or lack of counsel for children in Connecticut,185 Flor-
ida,186 Georgia,187 New York,188 and Washington.189
 184. Steele, supra note 182, at 309–11; see generally Amy Harfeld, The Right to Counsel 
Landscape After Passage of The ABA Model Act—Implications for Reform, 36 NOVA L. REV.
325 (2012); Andrea Khoury, The True Voice of the Child:  The Model Act Governing the 
Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, 36 NOVA L.
REV. 313 (2012). 
 185. Steele, supra note 182, at 310; see generally Carolyn Signorelli, Connecticut’s Road 
to “Real” Attorneys for Kids, 36 NOVA L. REV. 391 (2012). 
 186. Steele, supra note 182, at 310–11; see generally Clark Peters & John Walsh, Fiscal 
Returns on Improved Representation of Children in Dependency Court:  The State of the 
Evidence, 36 NOVA L. REV. 435 (2012); Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids 
Aren’t Alright:  Every Child Should Have an Attorney in Child Welfare Proceedings in Flor-
ida, 36 NOVA L. REV. 345 (2012). 
 187. Steele, supra note 182, at 310; see generally Ira Lustbader & Erik Pitchal, Implemen-
tation of the Right to Counsel for Children in Juvenile Court Dependency Proceedings:  Les-
sons from Kenny A., 36 NOVA L. REV. 407 (2012). 
 188. Steele, supra note 182, at 310; see generally Gary Solomon & Tamara Steckler, 
Perspective:  New Era in Representing Children, 36 NOVA L. REV. 387 (2012). 
 189. Steele, supra note 182, at 310; see generally Erin Shea McCann & Casey Trupin, 
Kenny A. Does Not Live Here:  Efforts in Washington State to Improve Legal Representation 
for Children in Foster Care, 36 Nova L. Rev. 363 (2012). 
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